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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHERIE LYNN TUCKER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vs-

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Lower Court Civil No.
Case No. 930380-CA

JAMES CALVIN TUCKER,

Priority Classification

Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

submits the

following

as his brief

of

appellee in the above-entitled matter:

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
The above-entitled court has jurisdiction in this matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(g), (1987 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Defendant asserts that plaintiff has misstated the issues on
appeal in this matter, as follows:
A.

Plaintiff alleges that it is an issue whether the trial

court was unduly and unlawfully biased in changing custody from the
mother to the father.

In paragraph 3 of her statement of issues,

appellant also alleges that the court ignored the child's stability
and "present" custodial setting.
In reality, the custody determination in the trial court was
an initial custody determination.

There had never been any

permanent order of custody entered.

Therefore, the court did not

"change" custody of the minor child, since permanent custody had
never been awarded in the first instance.
B.

The issue presented on appeal is whether or not the trial

court abused its discretion in awarding custody of the parties'
minor child to the defendant, rather than to the plaintiff.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS. CASES, STATUTES and RULES
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-10 (1953 as amended) is or may be
dispositive of the appeal in this issue.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the final judgment and decree of divorce
entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court
Judge presiding, on May 11, 1993.
Plaintiff

(also hereinafter

"the mother") commenced this

action by filing a complaint for divorce on September 27, 1991.
The mother was awarded temporary custody of the parties7 minor
2

child, and defendant (hereinafter also "the father") was awarded
reasonable and liberal rights of visitation.
The matter was heard over multiple days of trial in 1993,
after

which

the

trial

court

entered

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law, and ordered that the defendant be awarded
custody of the child subject to plaintiff's reasonable and liberal
rights of visitation.
It is from this order awarding the father custody of the
parties7 child that the mother has filed this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The parties to this action were formerly husband and

wife, having been married on February 26, 1988. They separated on
or about July 1, 1991.
November 30, 1988.
2.

They had one child, Jessica Tucker, born

(Findings, 2, 5 and 10).

Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in the court

below on September 27, 1991.

A hearing on temporary custody

occurred before the District Court Commissioner, Michael S. Evans,
on October 21, 1991. Pursuant to that hearing, a temporary order
was issued granting plaintiff custody of Jessica, subject to
defendant's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. (R. , 47).
3.

A trial was held in this matter on February 22 and

23,

1993. The court heard closing arguments and made a ruling from the
3

bench on March 9, 1993.

The court ordered, among other things,

that custody of Jessica should be with her father.
4.

(R., 130-133).

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of

Divorce were entered May 11, 1993. (R. , 134-161). Plaintiff filed
a timely notice of appeal.
5.

A custody evaluation completed in this matter by Dr.

Monica Christy, who interviewed both parties to this action, and
the

child,

and

various

collateral

contacts.

She

performed

psychological testing on the parties and the child, and completed
a written custody report.

A copy of that custody report is

attached hereto as and addendum.
6.

Another expert witness testified at the trial.

Dr.

Donald Strassberg testified that he had completed an assessment of
the plaintiff and Jessica in May of 1992. Dr. Strassberg did not
interview

Mr.

Tucker,

nor

any

of

the

collateral

contacts

interviewed by Dr. Christy. He made a written report and testified
at trial.
7.

The marriage here in issue was the second marriage for

the plaintiff.

She had been married briefly at age 23, which

marriage ended in divorce in June 1983.

(Tr.R., 311, 312). This

marriage was the first marriage for the defendant.
8.

Both parties had been employed outside the home on a

full-time basis since the birth of the minor child. Plaintiff had
4

worked as a customer service representative for TCI Cablevision of
Utah, for approximately five and one-half years prior to trial.
(Tr.R., 313). The plaintiff's gross monthly income was $1,582.00
per month as of the date of trial.

(Findings, 8). Her usual work

schedule was 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. or 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, and one Saturday every three weeks. (Tr.R.,
321) .
9.

Defendant had worked for TCI Cablevision as an installer

technician since January of 1990, or for a period of over three
years.

(Tr.R., 476). His work hours were 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,

for a six-day week, alternating with a four day week from 10:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

(Tr.R., 464-466).

the time of trial was $2,021.00.
10.

Defendant's gross income at

(Findings, 8).

After the birth of Jessica, plaintiff returned to work on

a swing shift from noon until 10:00 p.m., four days per week.

At

that time, Mr. Tucker took care of the child in the evenings. The
child was in the care of third parties during the afternoon, four
days per week.
11.

(Tr.R., 321).

Defendant supplied a substantial portion of the primary

care for the child during the time of the parties' marriage.
(Tr.R., 425). Mr. Tucker would take the child to the babysitter.
(Tr.R., 427). When plaintiff left for work prior to the defendant,
the defendant/father would get the child ready for the day and take
5

her to daycare,

(Tr.R., 428).

During the time when plaintiff

worked a swing shift until 10:00 p.m., Mr. Tucker prepared the
evening meal for the child, put the child to bed, and he did most
of the other cooking on other occasions. Defendant testified that
bathing Jessica was "a 50-50 thing."

(Tr.R., 429).

Several

neighbors of the parties testified that Mr. Tucker often tended the
child by himself, while the plaintiff visited with a neighbor down
the street in the evenings.
12.

(Tr.R., 310-490).

The plaintiff/mother suffered from severe mood swings

during the marriage.

(Findings, 22e).

The court characterized

these mood swings as "a history of emotional instability on the
part of the plaintiff." The trial court found the defendant to be
significantly more stable, despite the plaintiff's "substantial
progress" made
separation.

in personal therapy

and treatment during the

Dr. Christy made a finding, regarding the party's

emotional stability as follows: "There are differences however, in
emotional stability.

Mrs. Tucker is not as settled

in her

identity, has been given to mood swings, and is more conflicted and
less stable in relationships with others.

Continued fluctuations

in mood and relationships are considered likely." (See "Addendum")
13.

Defendant expressed concerns about plaintiff's caretaking

of the child at trial.

He testified about an incident which

occurred in January 1991, in which the plaintiff had driven off
6

with the minor child under circumstances which defendant felt
threatened the health and safety of the child.

(Tr.R., 438-440).

He testified about an incident when plaintiff left the minor child
alone and unattended in the bathtub at the age of eighteen months.
(Tr.R., 436).
14.

During the period of separation, prior to the custody

trial in this matter, defendant had visitation with the minor
child, which was more extensive than the standard schedule of
visitation.

Specifically, Mr. Tucker picked up the child on

Thursday night for weekend visitation, and kept the child through
Sunday evening.

(Tr.R., 330-332, 369).

Mr. Tucker also had

additional extra visitation with the child at his request. (Tr.R.,
340) .
15.

After leaving the marital home, the plaintiff lived alone

with her daughter in a rented home for about one year, and then
moved in with her parents for approximately eight months. She then
purchased

a

home

in

conjunction

with

approximately one month before the trial.
16.

one

Shawnda

Stevens

(Tr.R., 365).

Mr. Tucker remained in the marital residence, the same

residence where the child had lived during the parties7 marriage,
from the time of the parties7 separation through the time of the
trial.

(Findings,

10).

Accordingly,

plaintiff

had

three

residences during the eighteen month period of the parties7
7

separation, while the defendant continued to reside in the marital
home with which the child was familiar.
17.

After separating from the defendant, the mother became

involved in a relationship with another woman, Ms. Stevens, which
plaintiff

testified

relationship.

was

Ms.

a

monogamous

Stevens

and

cohabitated

committed
with

lesbian

plaintiff

in

plaintiff's parents7 home commencing in September of 1992. (Tr.R.,
345-346). Plaintiff and Ms. Stevens then purchased a home together
approximately one month prior to the trial.

(Tr.R., 346).

It

should be noted that no custody evaluator ever assessed the fitness
of Ms. Stevens to act in the role of a parent or stepparent to the
minor child.
18.

After receiving the reports of both expert witnesses, and

after two days of trial testimony, Judge Noel made findings which
were incorporated eventually into the court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, attached hereto.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A trial court is to exercise its discretion in awarding
custody, in the best interests of the child.

The findings of the

trial court support the award of custody to James Tucker.
findings were adequate.
standards

established

The

The trial court applied proper legal
in

the
8

state

of

Utah

for

custody

determinations in awarding custody to the father.

The

plaintiff

inaccurately assumes that the trial court based its decision solely
upon the plaintiff's sexual preference.

In reality, the trial

court expressly stated that it did not deprive the plaintiff of
custody on the basis of her sexual preference. The court listed at
least a dozen factors, all of which went into the determination
regarding custody.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT CUSTODY OF THE CHILD.
A.

The court did not "change" custody.

Throughout her brief, the plaintiff asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering a "change" of custody from
plaintiff to defendant. This tends to raise the issue before this
court as an issue of a modification of custody rather than a
determination of custody in the first instance.

It is clear that

there was a temporary custody order in this case, but there was no
permanent custody order ever entered until May 11, 1993.

A

temporary order is, by definition, not a permanent determination of
custody.

The first and only evidentiary hearing held in this

matter to determine custody was the trial which forms the basis for
this appeal.
9

B.

Standard of review.

A trial court judge has very broad discretion in making
custody determinations.
position to hear
witnesses.

It is the trial court judge who is in a

the testimony

and

observe the demeanor of

If the trial judge weighed carefully all the evidence

presented and ruled within established legal guidelines, then this
appellate court may not reverse the custody award of the trial
court.

Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d, 647 (Ut., 1988).

C.

Legal standard for custody determination.

The statute which sets

forth the

legal

standard

for a

determination of custody is found at Utah Code Ann., §30-3-10 (1989
as amended).

This statutes requires the trial court to consider

"the best interests of the child."
This statutory provision has been interpreted in case law in
which the courts have set forth a number of factors to consider in
determining
stability
maintaining

custody, including the following:
in

the

custodial

relationship

and

the need for
environment;

an existing primary custodial bond; the relative

strength of the parental bonds; the relative abilities of the
parents to provide care, supervision and a suitable environment for
the child and to meet the needs of the child; the preference of a
child old enough to evaluate the custody question; the benefits of
10

keeping siblings together and enabling sibling bonds to form; the
character and emotional stability of each proposed custodian; each
parent's desire for custody; and the apparent commitment of the
proposed custodian to parenting. Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d., 52 (Ut.
App., 1990).

D.

The trial court properly considered
relevant factors in its custody award.

all

Plaintiff, makes an argument that the trial court ignored the
child's supposed stability in the home of the plaintiff.

First,

this argument ignores the fact that the placement in the home of
the

mother

was

a

temporary

placement.

Therefore,

the

considerations set forth in Hogge v. Hogge, cited by the plaintiff,
simply do not apply because this is not a modification case.
More importantly, plaintiff's argument ignores all of the
evidence in favor of the court's determination that the child was
also significantly in the care of the defendant and would be stable
in the home of the defendant.

Plaintiff's argument ignores the

evidence that the parties, had a joint parenting arrangement when
they were together, and that the parties had something akin to a
true joint custody arrangement after their separation, by the
acquiescence of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff's argument ignores the

fact that it was defendant who often got the child ready in the
morning and that it was defendant who often cared for her in the
11

evening, prepared her primary meal of the day, and put her to bed.
Plaintiff's argument ignores the testimony adduced at trial from
the parties' neighbors and friends that the plaintiff was often
absent from the home, visiting friends and leaving the child in the
care of defendant. This argument ignores the report of Dr. Monica
Christy, finding that the defendant was actually the more nurturing
and caring of the two parents.
Defendant acknowledges that the case law in the state of Utah
requires

that,

in

a

custody

dispute

between

fit

parents,

"considerable weight" should be given to the identity of the
primary caretaker in a case where the child has been in the care of
one parent. The trial court in this matter has done exactly that.
The trial court addressed the question of the primary care provided
by plaintiff at numerous points in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and still reached the conclusion that defendant
should have custody of the child. Specifically, in Findings number
22b and 22c, the court addressed the issue of plaintiff's temporary
custody and found that a change in custody would not be traumatic
to the child because of her age, general condition of health and
well-being, and the level of bonding to her father.

Further, the

court found specifically that any trauma caused in the short-term
by a change in the temporary custody arrangement would be set off
by a long-term advantage to the child of living with her father.
12

The trial court did exactly what it has been mandated to do.

It

considered long and hard the fact that the child has been in
plaintiff's custody, and the impact of the change in custody.
Plaintiff's assets at page 29 of her brief that the court below
failed to make a specific finding that Jessica was in her mother's
custody for eighteen months. This is patently false. See Finding
22b.

E.

Other factors considered by the trial
court support the trial court's award of
custody.

The plaintiff asks this court to focus almost exclusively on
the issue of which parent had temporary custody of the child during
the pendency of this action. The court did address this issue and
did give substantial consideration to the primary residence of the
minor child during the pendency of the divorce case. However, the
court considered a number of other factors which weighed heavily,
and should have weighed heavily, in the custody determination. For
plaintiff to assert that "Judge Noel has provided no compelling
reasons to change custody in this case. . ."is simply false.
The court made the following specific findings in further
support of its custody order. The court found that there had been
a custody evaluation conducted by Dr. Monica Christy, that Dr.
Christy was the only expert who had examined all parties to this
13

action, and that her recommendation was in favor of awarding Mr.
Tucker custody.

(Findings, 22a). The court found that the minor

child had a stronger bond with her father.

(Findings, 22d). The

court found that there was a history of emotional instability on
the part of the plaintiff, that plaintiff had made substantial
progress in dealing with this issue in personal therapy, but the
court concluded that the father was significantly more stable
emotionally.

(Findings, 22e). The court considered the issues of

the minor child's preference and siblings in the minor child's
home, and found that, due to the minor child's circumstances, both
issues were moot.

(Findings, 22f and 22g).

The court found that

the defendant was able to spend slightly more time providing
personal care for the minor child than the plaintiff.
22h).

(Finding,

The court found that the child's church functions and

activities were important personally to the child and that there
was more religious compatibility between the defendant and the
minor child and that the defendant was more likely to foster a
continued involvement of the minor child in her church activities
in which she had previously participated.

(Findings, 22i). The

court found the defendant to be more morally fit to care for the
minor child.

(Findings, 22j).

Apparently, it is plaintiff's argument that a court should, by
rote, award custody of children to the parent who has temporary
14

custody, unless the child has been seriously abused or is showing
significant deterioration in the home of the temporary custodian.
Plaintiff seems to argue that the court should do this, even when
the temporary custodian is emotionally unstable and the child is
more bonded to the non-custodial parent. The effect of this would
be to impose a standard of a substantial change in circumstances
upon all parents seeking custody.

Further, such a standard would

undermine the Commissioner system in the District Courts, and would
force judges and parties to allow full multiple day trials on
custody issues, to determine temporary custody, even before the
performance of a custody evaluation or before discovery in a case,
in order to avoid violating a party,s rights to due process.
Where, as here, the trial court has done exactly what the
appellate courts have directed, in considering the impact of a
change in custody from the temporary custodian to the other parent,
that trial court determination should not be disturbed.

F.

The trial court did not show bias against
homosexual parents in its ruling.

Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the trial court deprived
plaintiff of custody of her child based solely upon her admission
that she was bisexual or homosexual and was residing with a woman
in a lesbian relationship.
Defendant concedes that a parent's sexuality, in and of
15

itself, is not a sufficient basis upon which to deny completely a
parent's fundamental right. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d., 641 (Ut.,
1980). Defendant admits that plaintiff's homosexuality is neither
a mental illness nor a deviancy, and in and of itself is not a
basis to deprive a parent of rights in a child. Defendant does not
seek to deprive plaintiff of her parental rights.

In fact, he

expressly seeks to foster a good relationship between plaintiff and
the parties' daughter, and encourages the plaintiff
substantial visitation with the child.

to have

The lower court, too,

adopted this same posture. The court made a specific finding that
plaintiff's sexual preference is neither a mental illness nor a
deviancy.

(Findings, 22j.ii).

The trial court did not terminate

the plaintiff's parental rights in any regard, and in fact, the
trial court awarded her joint legal custody, and liberal rights of
visitation.
The

(Findings, 23 and 25).

trial

court

appropriately

analyzed

the

plaintiff's

relationship with her lover in exactly the same manner it would
have been analyzed had plaintiff been involved in a heterosexual
relationship.

Defendant submits that, had plaintiff left the

marital residence to separate from her child's father, then lived
alone for a few months, then moved into her parents' home with a
male lover, then purchased a home with a male lover, and had she
then permitted the minor child to see her cohabitating both in her
16

parents' home and in her own home with her male lover, even to the
extent of allowing the child to get in bed between herself and her
male lover, the court would appropriately have questions about
plaintiff's judgment and moral fitness to act as a parent to her
child. The court would properly question the stability of someone
entering three marriage-like relationships by the age of thirtytwo.

The court would properly querstion the judgment of someone

entering a third "marriage" before she is divorced in the second.
The court would properly question the stability of someone moving
into three separate residences in eighteen months.
Plaintiff's conduct should not be viewed more favorably simply
because her lover is female rather than male. Judge Noel evaluated
plaintiff

as

she

would

have

been

evaluated

had

she

been

heterosexual.
Plaintiff herself admitted at trial that Jessica would crawl
into bed at night with plaintiff and Ms. Stevens.

(Tr.R., 353-

354) .
A trial court in a custody case is expressly ordered to
consider

a

stability."

prospective

custodian's

"character

and

emotional

The court is mandated to consider whether the parent

can provide "a suitable environment for the child."

Moon, supra.

It would, therefore, have been an error for the trial court to fail
to consider plaintiff's relationship with Ms. Stevens.
17

G.

The trial court
findings of fact.

did

not

make

erroneous

Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the trial court's award of
custody to the father cannot be sustained because the findings are
clearly erroneous.

This is simply not the case.

The plaintiff's first quarrel is with the court's finding
about the level of bonding between the child and father.

In the

court's finding of fact, the trial court specifically states that
the

basis

of

babysitter.

its

finding

is the

testimony

of

the

child's

The plaintiff cites to this Court testimony of the

custody evaluator, Dr. Monica Christy, to the effect that the
parents were "equally bonded" to the child, and the finding of Dr.
Strassberg, to attempt to overcome the court's determination about
bonding.

Plaintiff simply does not address the testimony of the

minor child's babysitter, upon which the court ultimately relied,
to establish that the court's finding is clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff's own mother testified that Jessica is strongly
bonded to her father and that Mr. Tucker is a good father. (Tr.R.,
228) .
In virtually every trial, witnesses testify to contradict each
other.

The trial court in this case heard the testimony of both

experts cited by plaintiff, and also heard the testimony of the
babysitter and others, and found that the court should rely on the
18

testimony of the babysitter about the level of bonding between the
child and father.

Plaintiff cannot overcome the trial court's

finding, nor establish that it was clearly erroneous, simply by
citing that there was other testimony in the record which the court
might have believed instead.
Plaintiff takes exception to the trial court's finding that
the defendant could spend "a bit more time with the child11 than
could the plaintiff. In making this finding, the trial court heard
testimony about the parties' respective work hours, the distance
they had to travel to work, other activities in which they had been
involved outside the home.

The court below heard testimony about

the plaintiff's propensity to leave the minor child at home, to go
visiting neighbors and friends.

If one analyzes plaintiff's work

schedule and defendant's work schedule, it is clear that plaintiff
works a forty-hour work week every week for two weeks, and a fortyeight hour work week every third week. It is clear that Mr. Tucker
works a forty-eight hour work week one week, alternating with a
thirty-two hour work week the next. Plaintiff therefore works 168
hours in four weeks compared to defendant's 160 hours in four
weeks.

When the work schedules are compared it is clear that the

plaintiff may have "a bit" more personal time to spend with the
child. He has a greater tendency, based upon his past conduct, to
actually spend available time with the child.
19

Again, the court's

finding is not clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff's next argument regards the court's finding about
religious compatibility between the defendant and the child. It is
true that both parties describe themselves as being members of the
LDS Church. However, testimony was adduced at trial by plaintiff's
own mother that her daughter was not particularly regular in her
church attendance. In response to the question: "Is it accurate to
say that Lynn does not regularly attend church at this time?"
plaintiff's mother responded

"yes."

Plaintiff's mother also

testified that Jessica's involvement in LDS Primary is something
that is important to Jessica personally, and that Jessica enjoys
attending this activity.

(Tr.R., 230). On the other hand, the

testimony from Mr. Tucker was to the effect that he attended church
regularly with his daughter.
should

Both parents agree that the child

attend the LDS church and participate

in activities.

Therefore, the court's finding that there was greater religious
compatibility

between the defendant and the minor child was

appropriate, given the defendant's greater tendency to participate
in church activities with the child, which the child apparently
enjoyed.
Plaintiff takes exception ifith the court's finding that there
was

a history

of

emotional

instability

on the part

of the

plaintiff. Plaintiff herself admits in her brief that the issue of
20

whether or not the plaintiff was emotionally unstable prior to her
marriage to defendant and during her marriage to defendant was
"hotly disputed."

By definition, if an issue is "hotly disputed,"

then there is evidence produced by both sides to support different
viewpoints.

Plaintiff produced substantial evidence at trial

attempting to deny that she had been "emotionally unstable."
Defendant produced substantial evidence at trial attempting to
demonstrate that plaintiff had in fact been "emotionally unstable."
Plaintiff's own mother testified that, in 1991, plaintiff was
"really depressed and very unsure of herself." Plaintiff's mother
testified that she told defendant that Ms. Tucker would eventually
just give Jessica to him.

(Tr.R., 230) Again, where evidence is

in contradiction, it is the trial court's duty to hear the evidence
and to resolve the factual dispute.

Here, the trial court

fulfilled its duty by hearing the conflicting evidence and making
a determination. Again, by definition, the trial court's decision
cannot, therefore, be "clearly erroneous."
Plaintiff objects to the court's finding about her "moral
fitness."

This issue has already been addressed above.

In summary, the trial court addressed in its findings the
issue of who had been the primary caretaker for the child.

The

court addressed the general interest in continuing previously
determined custody arrangements. The court considered the duration
21

and depth of each party's desire for custody.

(It should be noted

that the parties engaged in protracted litigation seeking custody,
lasting over one year duration.

Had either party not had a

compelling desire for custody, it is clear that the party lacking
a compelling desire for custody would have dropped out of the
contest long before he or she incurred the financial cost and
emotional expense of the trial.

Plaintiff also attempts to

establish that defendant lacked a desire for custody because he did
not seek custody in the first instance.

Dr. Monica Christy

explains this apparent contradiction by pointing out that Mr.
Tucker believed, in the beginning, that a father could not obtain
custody of a pre-school aged child.)
The court addressed the ability of either parent to function
as a parent. The court considered the child's need for stability.
The court considered the emotional health and well-being of each
parent.

The court considered that the defendant continued to

reside in the home with which the child was familiar, while the
plaintiff
separation.

had

moved

three

times

during

an

eighteen

month

The court considered the child's bonding to each

parent, and the parties' religious compatibility with the child,
and the judgment and moral fitness of each.
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CONCLUSION
Having appropriately considered all of the evidence in the
case and having made proper findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the trial court properly awarded the parties joint legal
custody.

The trial court properly made the defendant the primary

physical custodian and awarded the plaintiff liberal rights of
visitation.

None of the court's factual findings are clearly

erroneous, since the evidence at trial was substantially in
contradiction on almost all issues. The trial court should only be
reversed if there is an abuse of discretion. There is not an abuse
of discretion in this case, and the trial court's determination
regarding custody should stand.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of December, 1993.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused
the foregoing APPEAL BRIEF to be served upon plaintiff by mailing
two true and correct copy of the same in an envelope, postage prepaid, and addressed to:
SUZANNE MARELIUS
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
on the

day of

, 1993.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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INTERMOUNTAIN COUNSELING
CENTER
545 East 4500 South, Suite E-260
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

MONICA D. CHRISTY. PH{J
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST
DIRECTOR
LYNETTE MALMSTROM, LCSV»
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKEJJ
ELAINE A. WINTER. LCSV*
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKPH

(801) 263-3335

SANDRA FOSTER. MSty
CERTIFIED SOCIAL WORKER
BRUCE IACOBSON. PH.D
COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST
AND ASSOCIATES

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
TUCKER, James
AGE:
33
DATE OF BIRTH: 3-26-58
REFERRED BY: Fphraim H. Fankhauser and Mary C. Corporon
JUDGE: The Honorable Michael Evans
CIVIL NO.: 91-4903959DA
DATE OF EVALUATION: 1-10-92 to 3-2-92
DATE OF REPORT: 3-13-92
ASSESSMENT TOOLS:
Individual Clinical Interviews—3, total of 3 hours
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
Rotters Incomplete Sentence Blank
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire
Report of Educational, Occupational, and Residential History
Parent Questionnaire
Child Care History
Home Visit
Individual Interview with Carol Birchf Lynne Tucker's mother
Telephone Interview with Donna B. Steadmanf Jessica's former day
care teacher
Review of letters submitted on behalf of Lynne and James Tucker
REASON FOR REFERRAL:
Lynne and James Tucker were both referred for psychological
evaluations in conjunction with a custody dispute involving their
three-year-old daughter, Jessica Lynn.
Custody recommendations
were also requested.
FAMILY AND MARITAL HISTORY:
Jim grew up in the L.A. area. His mother divorced his father
when he was one or two years of age and his natural father later
died when Jim was sixteen without Jim ever having known him. His
mother married again when Jim was two or three years of age.
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They divorced when Jim was eight. He describes his stepfather as
having cared for them but not wanting the responsibility of a
family, preferring to be a playboy. Jim was a spokesman for his
four brothers and sisters in terms of arranging visits with his
stepfather.
Jim recalls that the family had alot of financial
problems and there were problems with child support and sporadic
visitation. His mother worked as an RN after the divorce. They
had a good relationship and he feels he is like his mother in
that both of them are easygoing.
Jim obtained a "B-M average during high school. Jim attended a
school in which there were racial problems and prevalent use of
drugs.
There was also some violence in the neighborhood so the
family moved to Orange County before he finished high school.
Jim never used drugs or smoked himself and dated little in high
school. He played church sports and excelled in this area. He
lived with his mother until he was 20 years old at which point he
went on a mission to South Africa. Before the mission, he dated
frequently.
Upon returning, he attended Community College and
lived in an apartment with his brother.
He then moved in with
his stepfather for awhile, became involved in church activities,
and tried a variety of jobs. Jim had two serious relationships
before he met and married Lynne. The last one was for about two
to three years bnt he decided against proposing since her mother
was vindictive and nTS alTTffTend WSLS not-' t-ti^f prefty. "He became
involved in many church activities and groups.
He and Lynne
dated for about six months and he recalls that they had fun
together and had many similar outdoor interests.
Jim and Lynne were married in the LDS Temple in February of 1988.
He recalls that as soon as she became pregnant she went into a
five month depression and acted as though she hated him. He did
not understand the reason for her depression or anger.
He was
working on commission and after he quit that job, at her
insistence, she seemed to be less dpprpsspd.
she, was upset that
he watched JU. ;_r> h4-e- ^azaBuzs and that he wore pajamas around" tie
holism.
Jim recalls that she complained that he was not a m=m
unless he went hunting and compared him to he*- fnrmerfrtrbbalf8and
Jier.father. Since- L-ynu^- -e^reTTenced pain with intercourse, there
were sexual problems as well. Jim understood that Lynne had been
involved in a lesbian relationship for awhile before she was
married but he believed that she had religiously resolved this
aspect of her past and was committed to a heterosexual
relationship.
Jim felt that Lynne never trusted him and he did not understand
why. She would not even reveal her salary to him. She began to
spend an increasing amount of time at a lesbian couple's home
down the street.
Jim maintains that he took care of the house
inside and out and did all of the dishes and cooking. He feels
that she did not spend enough time with Jessica and once left her
2
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in the bathtub for a couple of hours while she was visiting her
friend, Vickie.
She was not interested in attending church and
she felt that others in the neighborhood did not like her.
Jim maintains that when the couple separated in June, he let
Lynne take Jessica for fear that she would kidnap Jessica if he
objected.
He felt that Lynne would eventually decide to allow
Jessica to live with him.
Lynne recalls that Jim was fine with
the custody arrangement until he received a phone call from a
neighbor. Jim admits to having received this phone call in which
he was told that he needed to be very concerned about Lynne 1 s
lifestyle and the effect upon Jessica.
Jim initially expressed
many concerns about the effect upon Jessica if she were to live
in a household where there was homosexuality.
Although he had
refused to speak with two lesbian women with families, as Lynne
had requested, he was more open to information presented by this
examiner.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , when told that living with a lesbian
m o t h e r h a s n o t b e e n s h o w n to a f f e c t c h i l d r e n ' s s e x u a l
orientation, he was able to accept this information.
Apparently
he had been told by friends that children are "destroyed" in
these families.
He noted that he was as concerned about Lynne's
emotional stability as he had been about her homosexuality.
Although Jim is attempting to keep an open mind on this issue, it
is not known to what degree his disapproval of Lynne's lifestyle
would affect his encouragement of a mother-daughter relationship
and visitation if he were to receive custody.

EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL

HISTORY:

After graduating from high school in 1976 and returning from a
mission, Jim attended Golden State Junior College in California
part time for about a year.
He has also attended approximately
three years of college, majoring in business, at the University
of Utah without obtaining a degree.
Prior to 1990, Jim had held
a number of different kinds of jobs for one to two year periods
of timeJ
He has worked in retail sales and attempted careers
selling real estate and insurance.
He also worked as a waiter
at the University of Utah and another restaurant.
Since January
of 1990, he has been employed at TCI Cable as a technician.
Jim plans to finish his business degree and is waiting for the
custody decision before planning when he will reenroll.
He has
discovered that he really enjoys landscaping and plans to go back
to s c h o o l w h e n he is in his 4Q's
to m a j o r in l a n d s c a p e
architecture.
He would like to then pursue a career in this
field in his 50 f s and 6 0 f s .
Although he would like to continue
'living in the same house for a long time to come, he acknowledged
that he may need to move closer to a university to both work and
attend school.
If he obtains custody, these educational plans
will be delayed somewhat.

3

Page 4
TUCKER, James

MEDICAL AND COUNSELING HISTORY;
Jim's medical history is minimal, including a tonsillectomy, a
burn on his wrist, and a few stitches when he was a child.
Jim recalls that when he was about twelve years of age, his
mother knew a counselor in California and had each one of the
children interviewed to see if they had been affected by the
divorce. Jim was assessed as being somewhat behind socially but
otherwise having no problems.
In his early 20's Jim had some
hurt feelings about his mother's divorce and not having a father.
He resolved these on his own.
In his mid 20's, Jim saw a
counselor at the University Counseling Center for six or seven
times to learn more about himself but was not having any specific
emotional problems.
Jim recalls being confused and worried
during the first part of his marriage.
He feels that the last
six months have been emotionally traumatic but he has not been
depressed.
He recommended that he and Lynne attend counseling
through LDS Social Services during the marriage but she felt that
the counselor would be biased.
He later attended only one
session with her counselor. Jim has never been hospitalized due
to emotional problems and has not been suicidal.
SCREENING FOR ALCOHOL/DRUG ABUSE, VIOLENCE, AND ARRESTS:
Jim tasted his stepfather's beer when he was a child but has not
used alcohol since and has never used drugs.
Jim steered away
from the use of these substances since both of his grandmothers
were alcoholics and because of his religious beliefs.
Jim noted that he has "tapped Jessica's behind" and threatened to
spank her but he would never do so.
He has not used violence
against anyone.
He has never been arrested except for a false
arrest oh one occasion when he was picked up because he had the
same birth date and name as someone who had a warrant out for
his arrest.
The matter was quickly dropped when the police
discovered the mistake.
PERSONALITY APPRAISAL:
J i-nr iiiipicLscd tJM-s^ -examiner as a very caring, honest, trusting
(almost naievely s o ) / ^motional individual. He had some trouble
'aescrr ibLn-g—h i 5 ojetr. personality *nri does pnt
have a highly,
inquiring nature._ He is easygoing to The "point that he may at
cimes let~~tasks slide; this may be irritating to others.
Nevertheless, letters from his former employers and neighbors
reveal that he is the person they would turn to to take care of
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important matters.
his character.

Even Lynne's mother

is very appreciative of

Jim feels that he has alot of patience with others and himself
but indicated that this is also a weakness in that he sometimes
thinks that time will solve problems and thus wastes time. He
views himself as a very kind person who is sensitive to others'
feelings.
He has good self-esteem, believing that his IQ is
above average and that he can do almost anything if he takes the
time.
He has had trouble motivating himself to finish school
which is of concern to him. He usually handles stress well but
indicated that he does bite his nails. Jim said that he tries
hard to not become angry and that he has never felt angry at
Lynne although he has felt hurt alot. He recognizes that she has
never intentionally tried to hurt him.
Jim responded to the MMPI questions in a way that is socially
acceptable and tends to minimize weaknesses.
However, an
analysis of his responses revealed no conscious defensiveness,
i.e., there was no deliberate attempt to slant his responses in a
self-favorable direction.
His cliniral-prnfJULe is ^similar to
individuals who tend to play rather J:ixed social role^and want
to be seen by others as rpasonablr and: ":onf orminq ho commoji
social standards. He is above average as cbmpdied to others in
terms of his level of organization and practical functioning. He
may tend to act as though others should conform to his
stereotypes and social expeati^'-aiiss more than they actually do.
At times he may have 3 lack of self-awarenesS-* and consequences
for his actions.
Gener~all y__h£ ""tends ^o^overcontrol angry
impulses which can lead tcy angry outburst's^j^rom time to time.
(In Jim's case, since there were no allegations of any display of
anger, this interpretation may not apply to him.)
He does tend
to externalize problems away from himself, i.e., blame oJLhers
when ^Mrujs ^o not work out well.
There were no significant
symptoms oiP anxiety o T d~epTe"5~s ib n.
He tends to be more
interested in verbal and aesthetic interests rather than
mechanical and outdoor activities.
Rebellious feelings towards one's father is also associated with
this profile.
Such individuals, however, tend to show their
resentments and anger indirectly.
His profile, although
suggestive of some of these elements, is within the normal range.
Other testing reveals a tendency towards emotionality which was
also observed by this examiner when Jim tearfully talked about
the difficulties that Jessica has had with the divorce.
He is
currently frustrated that the efforts that he made to preserve
his marriage were not good enough.
He appears accepting of
faults in himself and others and yet still would like to achieve
his potential. He is very attached to his home, prefers a more
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rural lifestyle, and has a very traditional
life entails.

sense of what

family

PARENTING STYLE:
Jim appears very concerned about the confusion and difficulty
that Jessica is having with the divorce.
He is very protective
of her and indicated that he would reject the notion of joint
physical custody because it woo-Zd--be too_ difficult for Jessica.
He does not object to joint Ipgal custody, cut would want to be
the primary c u s t o d i a l -- He recognizes that Lynne loves Jessica
very, much just as he does__bu.t_he _feels_ that be_ could_ give_Jessica
more personal attention, wo»"M not- let anv h*H moods affect' hpr.
a~nd is more family oriented that is Lynne and Jber _f amily.
He
teels that Lynne relies on" "heir motner" coo much and doesn't" spend
enough personal time with Jessica.
He^.-rears^ that Lynne would
push Jessica away and yel] at her when she* I s *iri~_j3_bad mood", as
siie reportedly did duri'ng tfhe marriage, and~that the emotional
d e m a n d s that Lynne would place on Jessica would affect her
negatively.
He is also concerned about Lynne not attending to
Jessica's safety needs.
Besides the bathtub incident, he noted
that Lynne once let Jessica under a car when he was working on
it.
Jim fears that Lynne would be very controlling (like her father)
in h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h J e s s i c a as
she w a s with
him.
Reportedly, Lynne would stress activities such as dance lessons
w h e r e a s Jim feels that Jessica should be more involved in the
h o m e , with her friends, and with her family.
He would, thus,
give priority to personal time.
Jim currently works a six-day week alternated with a four-day
w e e k ; his hours are 8:00 to 5:00.
In the summer, one out of
five w e e k s , he works a shift of 10:00 to 7:00.
If he had
custody, he would place Jessica in the same day care she attended
b e f o r e . ' Both Jim and Lynne agree that she received very good
care there.
It is suspected that he would be generous in
granting visitation time to both Lynne and her mother, following
a schedule similar to the one he has now.
All those interviewed indicated that Jessica does not pose
d i s c i p l i n a r y problems.
Jim admitted that he is not much_qf __a_
disciplinarian.
Likewise, Tfm is not particularly aetinirive or
detailed in his responses to written questions about how he
w o u l d h a n d l e s i t u a t i o n s with children.
While there is no
suggestion that he would be inappropriate in his handling of
s i t u a t i o n s , he c o u l d probably use a greater repertoire of
techniques and more confidence in this area.
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Mrs. Steadman, Jessica's day care teacher, noted that she hnew
Jim bett&z "th-aLi Lynne because he often transported Jessica to and
from day care. She observed that Jessica tended to ask for her
father rather than her mother when she was stressed or upset
about something during the day; Mrs. Steadman thus believes that
they had a very strong attachment. Neighbors also wrote letters
supporting the notion that Jim and Jessica were well bonded andspent a great deal of time together while Lynne visited her
friend in the neighborhood.
During the home visit, Jessica was engaged in watching cartoons
and was rather weary of a stranger coming into her home wanting
to see her room, etc. She seemed very attached to her father and
there was a great deal of physical affection displayed between
the two of them.
Jessica was less physically active and
spontaneous during this visit but it was probably because this
was our first meeting.
She became very distressed and tried to
comfort her father when he became tearful in response to some
questions about her adaptation to the visitation.
Apparently,
Jessica is also very sensitive to her mother's emotions. Jim
indicated that Jessica often asks him to come over when he calls
her and tells him that she misses him. Jim recognizes that she
is now becoming more used to living with her mother. He appears
to care a great deal about her comfort level. Lynne noted that
once when Jessica had trouble going on a visitation with him, he
brought her back until she was more comfortable and ready to go.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS;
Jim is a very emotionally sensitive individual who seems to be
genuinely concerned about his daughter's welfare and, therefore,
is seeking custody. He has an easygoing nature, which sometimes
prevents him from accomplishing all that he wishes. He also has
some shortcomings as a disciplinarian. Nevertheless, he appears
to be the very reliable and caring individual that others have
perceived him to be. He places a high value on family life and
undoubtedly will marry again and have more children.
Please see Custody Recommendations.

Monica D. Christy, Ph ,/D.
MDC:slb
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MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, ?.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
CHERIE LYNN TUCKER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

-vs-

Civil No.

914903959DA

JAMES CALVIN TUCKER,
Defendant.

Judge Frank G. Noel

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before the
above-entitled court on Monday, the 22nd and 23rd day of February,
1993, the Honoraole Franx G. Noel, District Court Judge presiding;
the court having proceeded tc hear the testimony of the parties and
their witnesses, to receive the exnibits of the parties, to hear
the arguments of parties' counsel, and to review the file and the
pleadings contained therein, and to review the custody evaluation
and report filed by Dr. Monica Christy with the court, and the
evaluation ana report filea cy jr. uonaiu S^rassDery, cu.u ~-iw
thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court now makes and

enters the following:
FIFPINGg OF FftC?T
1.

Eacn party r.as been a resident of Salt Lake County, State

of Utah for three monrns or more immediately prior to the filing of
this action.
2.

That the parties are nusoand and wife having been married

February 26, 1988 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

There are irreconcilable differences between the parties

and eacn party is entitled to receive a Decree of Divorce from the
other upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
4.

The parties maintained their marital domicile in Salt

Lake County, Stare of Utan, and the acts complained of herein
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

There has been one minor child born as issue of the

parties' marriage, namely, Jessica, born November 30, 1988.
6.

Neither party is receiving any public assistance for the

benefit of the minor child.
7.

No proceedings involving the custody of the child have

been filed or are pending in the juvenile court or in any other
state.
8.
Utah.

The plaintiff is employed by TCI Cable in Salt Lake City,
The defendant is also employed by TCI Cable in Salt Lake

City, Utah.

The court finds that the plaintiff's gross income is
2

in the sum of $1,582.00 per month.

The court

finds that the

defendant's gross income is in the sum of $2f021.00 per month.
9.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

acquired an interest in certain real property located in Salt Lake
County, State of 7tan, commonly know as 3406 West 13175 South,
Riverton, Utah 84065.

This property is currently the subject of a

mortgage indeoteaness, and the mortgage payment for the property is
in the approximate sum of $600.00 per month.
10.

The parties separated on or about July 1, 1991.

At the

time of the separation, the plaintiff moved out of the marital
residence of the parties, taking the minor child, Jessica, with
her.

The

continuously
mortgage

defendant
since

obligation

has

remained

in

the

the parties' separation,
tnereon

since

July

marital
and
i,

residence

has paid
1991,

the

without

contribution from the plaintiff.
11.

It

is reasonable,

just

and

proper

that

the

marital

residence be appraised forthwith, by a duly qualified real estate
appraiser, and that the cost of the appraisal be shared equally by
the parties.

Further, it is reasonable that the net equity of the

parties in the property, as determined by appraisal, be divided
between the parties.

Specifically, this should be accomplished as

follows:
a.

The defendant snould be awarded all right, title and
3

interest in the real property free and clear of any interest of the
plaintiff,

subject

to the mortgage

indebtedness

thereon

which

defendant should be ordered to pay and assume and to hold the
plaintiff harmless thereon.
b.

Plaintiff should be awarded a lien upon the real

property for one-half the parties' net equity in the property, said
lien to be interest bearing at the rate of 6% per annum, from the
date hereof, and said lien to be payable by defendant to plaintiff
upon the first to occur of the following events:
i.

The sale of the property at the defendant's

ii.

The defendant's remarriage or cohabitation in

election;

the home with an unrelated adult;
iii. The defencant ceasing to use the home as his
primary place of residence;
iv.

The death of the defendant;

v.

Five years from the date of signing and entry

of the Decree of Divorce herein.
12.

During the course cf their marriage, the parties have

acquired an interest in a tineshare in East Canyon Resort.

It is

reasonable, just and proper that this time share be sold as soon as
is commercially feasible at a commercially reasonable sales price,
and that the parties be ordered to cooperate in that sale and to
4

use their best

efforts to

accomplish

that sale.

Out

of

the

proceeds of the sale, the defendant's mother should be reimbursed
for ail sums expended by her during the separation of the parties
to preserve this asset.

After payment of the underlying mortgage

obligation, outstanding fees and assessments of the condominium
group, and the payment of the defendant's mother, the remaining
sale proceeds, if any, or loss, if any, should be divided equally
between the parties, one-half to each.
13.
each

During the course of their marriage, the parties have

acquired

a

retirement

plan

through

their

respective

employment, and each party should be awarded all right, title, and
inrerest in his cr her own retirement plan, free and clear of any
interest of the other party.
14.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

acquired an interest in certain motor vehicles, including a 1987
Hyundai, 1970 pickup truck, a camper, and a 1984 Topaz.

The 1987

Hyundai and the camper should be awarded to the plaintiff free and
clear of any interest of the defendant, subject to any indebtedness
incurred thereon, which the plaintiff should be ordered to pay and
assume and to hold defendant harmless thereon.

The 1970 pickup

truck and the 1984 Topaz should be awarded to the defendant free
and

clear

of

any

interest

cf

the

plaintiff,

subject

to

any

indebtedness incurred thereon, wnich defendant should be ordered to
5

pay and assume and to hold plaintiff harmless thereon.

Plaintiff

made claim at trial that the 1987 Hyundai was a premarital asset of
the plaintiff and should be awarded to her as her sole and separate
property.

However, the court finds thatf

though the car was

purchased by plaintiff prior to the parties7 marriage, it was paid
for

in substantial

part

jointly

by

the

parties

during

their

marriage out of their joint incomes, and the court finds that the
Hyundai is a marital asset.
15.

During the course of their marriage the parties received

income tax returns for the tax year 1991, in the sum of $250.17
from the State of Utah, and $1,061.41 from the United States of
America.

These checks are currently

defendant's counsel.

in the trust

account of

These sums should be divided equally between

the parties, one-half to each.

Further, plaintiff should receive

interest on these income tax refunds at the rate of 6% per annum
for a period of 11 months.
16.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

acquired an interest in certain items of household furnishings and
fixtures and personal clothing and effects.

Each party should be

awarded the personalty currently in his or her possession with the
exception

that

the

defendant

should

be

awarded

all

personal

clothing and effects and furniture associated with the minor child
of the parties, for reason that he will have custody of the minor
6

child.

Specifically, defendant should be awarded the crib which

was the crib for the parties' child.
17.

Each party to this acrion is able bodied and employable.

The marriage of the parries is of relatively short duration.

The

plaintiff is currently 33 years of age. The defendant was 34 years
of age ar the time of trial and turned 35 on March 26, 1993.
Furrher, the courr finds -hat the plainriff is currently living
under

circumsrances

meaning of Utah law.

which

constitute

cohabitation

within

the

Furrher, both parties to this action have

waived their respective claims to alimony, during the course of the
trial.

Based thereon ir is reasonable, just and proper that

neither party be awarded any alimony from the other.
18.
Christy.

A custody evaiuarion was conducted herein by Dr. Monica
Defendant advanced the cost of that evaluation.

It is

reasonable, just and proper that the defendant continue to bear the
costs of that evaluation, in full, and that the plaintiff not be
required to contribute to the cost of that evaluation.

Dr. Donald

Strassberg conducted an evaluation of plaintiff and the parties'
child.

Plaintiff advanced the costs of that evaluation.

It is

reasonable, just and proper that the plaintiff continue to bear the
costs of that evaluation, in full, and that the defendant not be
required to contribute to the costs of that evaluation.
19.

It is reasonable, just and proper that each party pay and
7

assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees incurred in
this action.
20.

During the course of their marriage, the parties have

incurred certain debts and obligations, which should be paid and
assumed according to the schedule of proposed
indebtedness set forts m

distribution

of

the plaintiff's Exhibit 11, admitted at

the time of trial, with the exception of the debt to East Canyon
resort, which is referred to in paragrapn 12 above.
21.

Each party has health and accident insurance coverage

available to him or to her through employment.

Each party works

for the same company, and therefore has identical health insurance
benefits available for the minor child.
reasonable,

The court finds that it is

just and proper that the defendant

be ordered

to

maintain the same health insurance coverage which has previously
been maintained by the plaintiff in behalf of the minor child, or
its equivalent, so long as sucn health insurance is available to
the defendant through his employment at reasonable cost. Plaintiff
should not be ordered to maintain health and accident insurance
coverage for the minor child.

The court finds it is appropriate

that the defendant maintain health insurance coverage rather than
the plaintiff, because the defendant will be the custodial parent
for the minor child, and it will facilitate the health insurance
claims process if the custodial parent is also the insured party.
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22.

The court finds that the issue of greatest concern to

both parries to this action is the issue of child custody.

It is

reasonable, just and proper, and is in the best interest of the
minor child, that the defendant be awarded the permanent physical
care, custody, and control of the child, subject to plaintiff's
reasonable and liberal rignts of visitation as defined below.

In

support of this finding regarding custody, the court makes the
following specific findings:
a.

A child custody evaluation was conducted herein by

Dr. Monica Christy, who was the only independent evaluator who
assessed both parties to testify at the time of trial, regarding
the issue of custody.

Dr. Monica Christy recommended that the

defendant have custody of the parties7 minor child.

An evaluation

was conducted herein by Dr. Donald Strassberg, who assessed the
plaintiff and the parties' child, but did not assess the defendant.
Dr. Strassberg found that plaintiff was a fit and
parent and that custody should be awarded to plaintiff.

appropriate
The court

finds that it should rely en the recommendation

of Dr. Monica

Christy and should not accept the recommendation

of Dr. Donald

Strassberg;
b.

The minor child is now four years of age and is not

yet attending school.

The plaintiff has had the temporary care,

custody and control of the miner child during the pendency of these
9

divorce proceedings, at first by reason of the parties' conduct,
and then pursuant to temporary

order of this court, and

this

condition has existed since approximately July l, 1991;
c.
minor

child

The court finds that a change in custody of the
from

the plaintiff

to

the defendant

will

not

be

substantially traumatic to the minor child because of her age,
genera, condition of health and wellbeing as testified to by Dr.
Monica Christy, and Dr. Donald Strassberg, the level of bonding to
her father, and the circumstances of the parties.

The court finds

that in the long run, any trauma caused by a change in the custody
arrangement will be temporary and will be off-set by a long term
advantage to the minor child of living with her father;
d.
bonding

The court finds that the minor child has a stronger

to her father, based upon the testimony

child's day care provider.

of the minor

The court finds that the minor child is

also closeiy bonded to her mother;
e.

The court finds that there is a history of emotional

instability on the part of the plaintiff.

The court finds that

there has been substantial progress made by the plaintiff during
the separation of the parties, in personal therapy and treatment,
and the court commends her for this progress, but the court finds
that the father is still significantly more stable;
f.

The court finds that the issue of the minor child's

10

preference is moor, fcr reason that the minor child has expressed
no preference, and the child is of such tender years that any
preference expressed would be irrelevant;
g.

The

minor

child

siblings, nor step-siblings.

has

no

siblings,

half-blood

Therefore, a consideration of the

status of her siblings is nor relevant in this action;
h.

The courr finds rhat the defendant is able to spend

a bit more time providing personal care for the minor child then is
rhe plaintiff;
The courr finds that the child7s church functions

i.

and acrivities are imporranr personally to the child.
finds

thar

there

is more

religious

comparibility

The court

between

the

defendanr and the minor child, and thar the defendant is more
likely to fcsrer a continued involvement of the minor child in the
church acriviries in which she has previously participated than is
the plaintiff;
j.

The

courr

finds

that,

because

of

moral

issues

presenred in this case, the defendant is a more fit parent to
exercise

cusrody

of

the

minor

child

than

is

the

plaintiff.

Specifically, the courr analyzes the circumstances of the plaintiff
as follows:
i.

The plaintiff and other witnesses

have

tesrified to the status of the plaintiff as a lesbian or bisexual
11

individual who

is currently

involved

in a monogamous

intimate

relationship, that amounts to cohabitation, with another woman.
Specifically, plaintiff and her female companion have purchased a
home together and cohabited together for a period of approximately
five months prior to trial, first

in the home of plaintiff's

parents, then in their own home, prior to the trial;
ii.

The court finds that the status of the

plaintiff as a lesbian or bi-sexual does not bear directly on her
parenting abilities, and the court finds that she should not be
deprived of custody
preference•
testified

of her ninor child based upon her sexual

Both Dr. Monica Christy and Dr. Donald Strassburg

that

homosexuality

is

not

a mental

illness

nor

a

deviancy, and the court adopts this finding;
iii. The plaintiff has chosen to act out her sexual
preference by conducting a relationship with a woman companion
involving cohabitation without benefit of marriage in the same home
with the minor child.
and

should

be

The court finds that this can be analyzed

analyzed

similarly

to

a

situation

involving

cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex without benefit of
marriage in the presence of a ninor child.

The court finds that

this conduct on the part of the plaintiff during the pendency of
this

action

and

prior

to

the

custody

trial

in -this

matter

demonstrates a lack of ^iorai example to the child and a lack of
12

moral fitness. This conduct is unlawful in the State of Utah; and,
k.

The plaintiff 's companion was not a witness at trial

nor evaluated by any expert witness as to her fitness to act in the
role of step-parent to the child.
23.

The court finds that the parties are capable of making a

joint legal custody arrangement work, and that such a joint legal
custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the minor
child.

Therefore, the plaintiff and defendant should be awarded

joint legal custody of the child with the defendant to be the sole
physical

custodian

of

the child,

and with

plaintiff

to

have

reasonable and liberal rights of visitation.
24.
medical

Plaintiff should be permitted unrestricted access to the
and

educational

records

of

the

minor

child

and

the

defendant should consult the plaintiff before making any major
decisions regarding the health, education or welfare of the minor
child.

However, in the event of a conflict between the parties

regarding such decisions, the determination of the defendant should
be governing.
25.

Plaintiff should be awarded reasonable and liberal rights

of visitation with the minor child, to be defined, in the event
that the parties are unable to agree upon a schedule of visitation,
as follows:
a.

each Wednesday evening from 5:30 p.m. until
13

3:20 p.m.; and
b.

alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m.

until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and
c.

Holiday visitation shall be defined as 6:00

p.m. the day of the holiday until 7:00 p.m. the day after
the holiday unless specified otherwise.

The parties

shall alternate with plaintiff to have the

following

holidays in odd numbered years: Human Rights Day; Easter
from Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m.; Memorial Day
from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 7:00 p.m.; July
24th to 11:00 p.m.; Veteran's Day; the day before the
child's birthday from 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; the
first half of Christmas vacation, including Christmas Eve
and Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m.; and in the even numbered
years:

New Year's Day; President's Day; July 4th to

11:00 p.m.; Labor Day from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday
at 7:00 p.m.; Columbus Day; UEA weekend from Wednesday at
6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; the child's actual
birthday from 2:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; Thanksgiving
from Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and
the second half of Christmas vacation and from 1:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m. on Christmas Day; and
d.
7:00 p.m.;

Father's Day with the Father from 9:00 a.m. to

e.

Mother's Day with the Mother from 9:00

a.m.

until 7:00 p.m.;
f.

Summer to consist of four weeks, or, if the

child is in year round school, one-half of the school
breaks, with the custodial parent to be allowed two weeks
uninterrupted

vacation.

Notification

of

summer

visitation or vacation weeks with the child should be
provided in writing to the other parent at least 30 days
in advance; and
g.
26.

Telephone contact at reasonable hours.

The transition of custody

from the plaintiff to the

defendant should occur over a period during March and April of
1993.

Defendant's visitation with the minor child should increase

gradually over this period of time, and the plaintiff's physical
custody of the minor child should decrease gradually such that the
defendant has full-tine custody on or about May 1, 1993.
27.

Defendant should be ordered to continue to pay child

support to the plaintiff for the months of March and April, 1993.
In the month of May, 1993, defendant's child support obligation to
the plaintiff should terminate, and plaintiff should be ordered to
pay child support to the defendant, in conformity with the Utah
Uniform Child Support Guidelir.es and the child support obligation
worksheet

which

is

attached

hereto
15

and

incorporated

herein

reference. Plaintiff's child support obligation to the defendant,
commencing May 1, 1993, will be in the sum of $169.00f together
with one-half of the defendants work-related day care expenses
reasonably and actually incurred for the minor child.

Further,

this support should continue until the minor child achieves the age
of 18 years or graduates from high school in the normal course of
her high school education, whichever event occurs later.
28.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
29.

If the plaintiff

falls thirty

(30) or more days

in

arrears in her child support obligation, the defendant should be
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 62A-I1-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988).
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF TAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this

action and over the subjeer matter of this action.
21

The parties are entitled to a Decree of Divorce from one

another, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing
between

the parties, the

immediately

same to

become

final

and

effective

upon being signed by the Judge and entered by the
16

Clerk.
3.

The Decree of Divorce granted to plaintiff should be in

conformance with the. foregoing Findings of Fact.

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney for Plaintiff
DATED: ~ w r ^ ~*3
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• ""Vi? district

•MAY I 1 190
xr -c,i».»Lr'"Y

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
CHERIE LYNN TUCKER,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

-vs-

Civil No.

914903959DA

JAMES CALVIN TUCKER,

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before the
above-entitled court on Monday, the 22nd and 23rd day of February,
1993, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge presiding;
the court having proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and
their witnesses, to receive the exhibits of the parties, to hear
the arguments of parties' counsel, and to review the file and the
pleadings contained therein, and to review the custody evaluation
and report filed by Dr. Monica Christy with the court, and the
evaluation and report filed by Dr. Donald Strassberg, and having
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now, therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

granted

a

Decree

of

Divorce,

dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon
being signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk.
2.

It is hereby ordered that the marital residence be

appraised forthwith, by duly a qualified real estate appraiser, and
that the cost of the appraisal be shared equally by the parties.
Further, it is ordered that the net equity of the parties in the
property, as determined by appraisal, be divided between the
parties.

Specifically, this should be accomplished as follows:
a.

The defendant

is awarded

all right, title and

interest in the real property free and clear of any interest of the
plaintiff, subject to the mortgage indebtedness thereon which
defendanr is ordered to pay and assume and to hold the plaintiff
harmless thereon.
b.

Plaintiff is awarded a lien upon the real property

for one-half the parties7 net equity in the property, said lien to
be interest bearing at the rare of 6% per annum, from the date
hereof, and said lien to be payable by defendant to plaintiff upon
the firsr to occur of the following events:
i.

The sale of the property at the defendant's

ii.

The defendant's remarriage or cohabitation in

election;
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the home with an unrelated adult;
iii. The defendant ceasing to use the home as his
primary place of residence;
iv.

The death of the defendant;

v.

Five years from the date of signing and entry

of the Decree of Divorce herein.
3.
Resorx

It is hereby ordered that the timeshare in East Canyon
be

sold

as

soon

as

is

commercially

feasible

at

a

commercially reasonable sales price, and the parties are ordered to
cooperate in that sale and to use their best efforts to accomplish
that sale. Out of the proceeds of the sale, the defendant's mother
should

be reimbursed

for ail sums expended by her during the

separarion of the parties ro preserve this asset.
the

underlying

assessmenrs

raorrgage

of the

obligation,

condominium

After payment of

outstanding

group, and the

fees

payment

and

of the

defendants mother, the remaining sale proceeds, if any, or loss,
if any, shall be divided equally between the parties, one-half to
each.
4.

Each party is awarded all right, title, and interest in

his or her own retirement plan, free and clear of any interest of
the other party.
5.

The

1987

Hyundai

and the camper

are

awarded

to the

plaintiff free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject
3

to any indebtedness incurred thereon, which the plaintiff is
ordered to pay and assume and to hold defendant harmless thereon*
The 1970 pickup truck and the 1984 Topaz are awarded to the
defendant free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff, subject
to any indebtedness incurred thereon, which defendant is ordered to
pay and assume and to hold plaintiff harmless thereon.
6.

The income tax refund checks are to be divided equally

between the parries, one-half to each.

Further, plaintiff is to

receive interest on these income tax refunds at the rate of 6% per
annum for a period of 11 months.
7.

Each party is awarded the personalty currently in his or

her possession with the exception that the defendant is awarded all
personal clothing and effects and furniture associated with the
minor child of the parties. Specifically, defendant is awarded the
crib which was the crib for the parties7 child.
8.

Neither party is awarded any alimony from the other.

9.

The defendant is ordered to bear the costs of the custody

evaluation of Dr. Moncia Christy, in full, and plaintiff is not
required to contribute to the cost of that evaluation, or to the
testimony of the evaluator at trial.

The plaintiff is ordered to

bear the costs of the evaluation of Dr. Donald Strassberg, in full,
and defendant is not required to contribute to the cost of that
evaluation, or to the testimony of the evaluator at trial.
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10.

Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own

court costs and attorney's fees incurred in this action.
The parties7 debts and obligations are to be paid and

11.
assumed

according to the schedule of proposed

distribution

of

indebtedness as follows:
TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFF:
and

overdraft,

Mervyn's,

ZCMI, ZCMI Credit Union loan

Discover,

First

Security

Bank

VISA,

EDUSERV student loan, Jodi Leslie and Ron Birch.
TO BE PAID BY DEFENDANT:

Rocky Mountain VISA, the water

softener debt, and all credit cards and loans incurred in his own
name.
12.

The defendant is ordered to maintain the same health

insurance coverage which has previously been maintained by the
plaintiff in behalf of the minor child, or its equivalent, so long
as such health insurance if available to defendant through his
employment

at

reasonable

cost.

Plaintiff

is not

maintain health and accident insurance coverage

ordered

to

for the minor

child.
13.

The

plaintiff

and defendant

are awarded

joint

legal

custody of the child, and defendant is awarded the sole physical
custody of the child, with plaintiff to have reasonable and liberal
rights of visitation.
14.

Plaintiff is permitted unrestricted access to the medical
5

and educational records of the minor child and the defendant is
ordered to consult the plaintiff before making any major decisions
regarding the health, education or welfare of the minor child.
However, in the event of a conflict between the parties regarding
such decisions, the determination of the defendant is governing.
15.

Plaintiff's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation

with the minor child, shall be defined, in the event that the
parties are unable to agree upon a schedule of visitation, as
follows:
a.

each Wednesday evening from 5:30 p.m. until

8:30 p.m.; and
b.

alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m.

until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and
c.

Holiday visitation shall be defined as 6:00

p.m. the day of the holiday until 7:00 p.m. the day after
the holiday unless specified otherwise.

The parties

shall alternate with plaintiff to have the

following

holidays in odd numbered years: Human Rights Day; Easter
from Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m.; Memorial Day
from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 7:00 p.m.; July
24th to 11:00 p.m.; Veteran's Day; the day before the
child's birthday from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; the
first half of Christmas vacation, including Christmas Eve
6

and Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m.; and in the even numbered
years:

New Year's Day; President's Day; July 4th to

11:00 p.m.; Labor Day from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday
at 7:00 p.m.; Columbus Day; UEA weekend from Wednesday at
6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; the child's actual
birthday from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; Thanksgiving
from Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and
the second half of Christmas vacation and from 1:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m. on Christmas Day; and
d.

Father's Day with the Father from 9:00 a.m. to

7:00 p.m.;
e.

Mother's Day with the Mother from 9:00 a.m.

until 7:00 p.m.;
f.

Summer to consist of four weeks, or, if the

child is in year round school, one-half of the school
breaks, with the custodial parent to be allowed two weeks
uninterrupted

vacation.

Notification

of

summer

visitation or vacation weeks with the child shall be
provided in writing to the other parent at least 30 days
in advance; and
g.
16.

Telephone contact at reasonable hours.

The transition of custody

from the plaintiff

to the

defendant is to occur over a period during March and April of 1993.
Defendant's

visitation

with

the

minor

child

shall

increase

gradually over this period of time, and the plaintiff's physical
custody of the ininor child shall decrease gradually such that the
defendant has full-time custody on or about May 1, 1993 •
17.

Defendant is ordered to continue to pay child support to

the plaintiff for the months of March and April, 1993,

In the

month of May, 1993, defendant's child support obligation to the
plaintiff terminates, and plaintiff is ordered to pay child support
to the defendant, commencing May 1, 1993, in the sum of $169• 00 per
month, together with one-half of the defendant's work related day
care expenses reasonably and actually incurred for the minor child,
until the child attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high
school in due course, whichever last occurs.
18.

Each

party

is ordered

to

execute

and

deliver

all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
19.

If the plaintiff falls in arrears in her child support

obligation,

the

defendant

is

entitled

to

mandatory

income

withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 62A11-401, £t. sea. (Supp. 1988).
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DATED THIS

FRANK G. NOEL
D i s t r i c r Courx Judge
Approved:

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
DATED: •><"- & - 93
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